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ICA/Secom
also DCID 1/7
13 FEB 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, SECOM

25X1 FROM:

Director of Security

SUBJECT: Request for Modification of DCID 1/7

REFERENCE: A. Memo to C/SECOM from C/PCS/INT/RR/DO,
dtd 11 Jan 86, Same Subject

B. Memo to SECOM Members from C/SECOM, dtd
19 July 85 (SECOM-D-195), Guidance on Use
of Orcon Control Markings

1. This Agency requests that the following proposed change to DCID 1/7 be submitted for formal consideration by the membership:

Page 6, Footnote 6, sentences one and two be changed to read, "Non-Intelligence Community components of the executive branch of government under contract to fulfill an intelligence support role may be treated as members of the Intelligence Community. In that event, release will be made only with the consent of the originator, will be solely for the specific purpose, and will not include authority to disseminate intelligence further."

2. As previously stated in reference A, this request is prompted by unilateral release of Directorate of Operations intelligence information reports by the Defense Intelligence Agency to the Library of Congress, Federal Research Division. It is recommended that the membership adopt this change to clarify an ambiguity in the current language of footnote 6 in this DCID.

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SUBJECT: Request for Modification of DCID 1/7

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OS/EO/PPS (11 Feb 86)

Distribution:

- Orig - Adse
- 1 - D/S Chrono
- 1 - PPS Chrono
- ① - OS Registry
- 1 - Policy Branch

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

Chrono

11 January 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, DCI Security Committee

25X1 VIA: Chief, PCS [redacted]

25X1 FROM: Chief, PCS [redacted]
25X1 [redacted]SUBJECT: Request for Modification of DCID on Security Controls
on the Dissemination of Intelligence Information

1. As a followup to our discussion on January 8, 1985 and to provide an official formal record of request, we hereby ask that the following proposed change in the DCID be submitted for Committee consideration in the near future. Please modify the first and second sentences in footnote 6 on page 6 of the DCID to read as follows: Non-Intelligence Community components of the executive branch of government under contract to fulfill an intelligence support role may be treated as members of the Intelligence Community. In that event, release will be made only with the consent of the originator, will be solely for the specific purpose and will not include authority to disseminate intelligence further.

2. As you know, this request is prompted by recent correspondence between CIA/DO and DIA, which we have shared with you, concerning DIA unilateral release of DO intelligence information reports to the Library of Congress, Federal Research Division. We believe our recommended change will help clarify an apparent ambiguity in the current language of the DCID.

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Orig - Addressee

1 - C/PCS/INT

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1 - Chrono

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- c. The control markings in paragraph 8 shall be individually assigned at the time of preparation of intelligence products and used in conjunction with security classifications and other markings specified by Executive Order 12356 and its implementing ISOO Directive. The markings shall be carried forward to any new format in which the same information is incorporated, including oral and visual presentations.

10. Obsolete Restrictions and Markings

The following markings are obsolete and will not be used subsequent to the date of this directive: WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED, WARNING NOTICE-INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED, WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED, CONTROLLED DISSEM, NSC PARTICIPATING AGENCIES ONLY, INTEL COMPONENTS ONLY, LIMITED, CONTINUED CONTROL, NO DISSEM ABROAD, BACKGROUND USE ONLY, NO FOREIGN DISSEM, USIB ONLY, and NFIB ONLY. Questions with respect to the current application of control markings authorized by earlier directives on the dissemination and control of intelligence and used on documents issued prior to the date of this directive should be referred to the originating agency or department.

11. Reporting Unauthorized Disclosures

Violations of the foregoing restrictions and control markings that result in unauthorized disclosure by one agency of the intelligence of another shall be reported to the Director of Central Intelligence through the DCI Security Committee.

Part II**12. Policy and Procedures Governing the Release of Intelligence to Contractors and Consultants**

- a. Intelligence Community components may release 'selected intelligence' to contractors and consultants (hereinafter "contractors"*) without referral to the originating components provided that:

- (1) Release is made only to private individuals or organizations certified by the SOIC (or his/her designee) of the sponsoring organization as being under contract to the United States Government for the purpose of performing classified services in support of a national security mission; and as having a demonstrated "need-to-know" and an appropriate security clearance or access approval. If retention of intelligence by the contractor is required, the contractor must have an approved storage facility.

* Release is the authorized visual, and, or physical disclosure of intelligence.

* The term "selected intelligence" excludes Foreign Service reports and SCI. Foreign Service reports may be released only with the permission of the Department of State. Release of SCI is governed by agreements and advisements between Intelligence Community components.

* Non-Intelligence Community government components under contract to fulfill an intelligence support role may be treated as members of the Intelligence Community. In that event, release will be solely for the specific purpose and will not include authority to disseminate intelligence further. Government-owned, contractor-operated (GOCO) laboratories performing classified services in support of the intelligence mission of an Intelligence Community component, and which are designated as authorized channels by an SOIC or his/her designee, are not considered as contractors subject to the provisions of this directive.

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee

SECOM-D-195

19 July 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECOM Members

25X1 FROM:

Chairman

SUBJECT: Guidance on Use of ORCON Control Marking

1. During the summer of 1984 SECOM members, by memoranda or orally, concurred in a revision of the guidance in DCID 1/7 on use of the ORCON control marking. A copy of the approved guidance is attached. That guidance has not yet been formally issued in a revision of DCID 1/7.

2. All DCIDs that are being retained are in the process of being reprinted without textual change but with new numbers. (SECOM originated DCIDs will bear their old numbers.) Because this reprinting may cause confusion on the status of the change members approved, it would be appreciated if addressees would advise elements of their organizations which are involved in disseminating ORCON-marked material of attached guidance and request them to apply it in the dissemination and use of such material.

25X1 Attachment:
ORCON Guidance

25X1 cc: DDO/CIA
ATTN: C/PCS

25X1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY When
Classified Attachment is Removed

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Attachment to SECOM-D-195

(Extract from DCID 1/7, paragraph 8b)

**DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION
CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR (ORCON)**

(First paragraph unchanged)

-- Information bearing this marking may not be disseminated beyond the headquarters elements ³ of the recipient organizations and may not be incorporated (in whole or in part) into other reports or briefings or used in taking investigative action without the advance permission of and under the conditions specified by the originator. As this is the most restrictive marking herein, agencies will establish procedures to insure that it is only applied to particularly sensitive intelligence and that timely procedures are established to review requests for further dissemination of intelligence bearing this marking. This marking may be abbreviated as "ORCON" or as "OC".

³ At the discretion of the originator, the term "headquarters elements" may include specified subordinate intelligence-producing components.

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee

SECOM-D-022

24 January 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Intelligence Control Group
Policy & Coordination Staff
Directorate of Operations, CIA

FROM:

[Redacted]

Chairman

SUBJECT: Revision of DCID 1/7

REFERENCE: Your 16 Jan 86 memorandum to me

As the referent memorandum notes, the DCI Security Committee (SECOM) has already approved your requested change to the language of the second sub-paragraph of section 8b of DCID 1/7. Your request for a change to footnote 6 to that DCID is yet to be addressed by SECOM. In order for it to be properly dealt with, please contact the CIA member of SECOM, [Redacted] Director of Security, CIA, and request him to introduce the change. We will then take expeditious action to circulate it for consideration by SECOM members. If you wish any other changes to be considered, please request the CIA member to introduce them as well.

[Redacted]

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Recommended Changes in the Revision of DCID 1/7

FROM:

EXTENSION NO

Chief, PCS/INT

DATE

17 January 1986

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

DD/PCN 21

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

1.

Director of Security, CIA

2.

3.

C / PPG

1/23/86

AK

4.

C / POLICY

1/23

DS

7.

8.

Registry

9.

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15.

-PII

-DCID 1/7

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee

SECOM-D-195

19 July 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECOM Members

25X1 FROM:

Chairman

SUBJECT: Guidance on Use of ORCON Control Marking

1. During the summer of 1984 SECOM members, by memoranda or orally, concurred in a revision of the guidance in DCID 1/7 on use of the ORCON control marking. A copy of the approved guidance is attached. That guidance has not yet been formally issued in a revision of DCID 1/7.

2. All DCIDs that are being retained are in the process of being reprinted without textual change but with new numbers. (SECOM originated DCIDs will bear their old numbers.) Because this reprinting may cause confusion on the status of the change members approved, it would be appreciated if addressees would advise elements of their organizations which are involved in disseminating ORCON-marked material of attached guidance and request them to apply it in the dissemination and use of such material.

25X1 Attachment:
ORCON Guidance

cc: DDO/CIA
ATTN: C/PCS

25X1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY When
Classified Attachment is Removed

25X1
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Attachment to SECOM-D-195

(Extract from DCID 1/7, paragraph 8b)

**DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION
CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR (ORCON)**

(First paragraph unchanged)

-- Information bearing this marking may not be disseminated beyond the headquarters elements ³ of the recipient organizations and may not be incorporated in whole or in part into other reports or briefings or used in taking investigative action without the advance permission of and under the conditions specified by the originator. As this is the most restrictive marking herein, agencies will establish procedures to insure that it is only applied to particularly sensitive intelligence and that timely procedures are established to review requests for further dissemination of intelligence bearing this marking. This marking may be abbreviated as "ORCON" or as "OC".

³ At the discretion of the originator, the term "headquarters elements" may include specified subordinate intelligence-producing components.

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16 January 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, DCI Security Committee
VIA: Chief, Policy & Coordination Staff
FROM: [REDACTED]
Chief, Intelligence Control Group
Policy & Coordination Staff
SUBJECT: Recommended Changes in the
Revision of DCID 1/7

1. A status report is requested on the revision and publication of DCID 1/7 containing changes in the definition of the ORCON control and other suggested changes by PCS/INT.

2. About a year ago I and [REDACTED] met with you and Don [REDACTED] to again register our concerns regarding certain changes made in the issuance of DCID 1/7 effective 7 January 1984 concerning the definition of ORCON without any DO coordination. We also discussed with you the need to modify the first and second sentences in footnote 6 on page 6 of the DCID. We shared with you at that time correspondence between CIA/DO and DIA concerning DIA unilateral release of DO reports to the Library of Congress, Federal Research Division. We stated that the recommended changes in the footnote would help to clarify an apparent ambiguity in the current language.

3. The DCID on "Security Controls on the Dissemination of Intelligence Information" issued with an effective date of 7 January 1984 contained editorial changes in paragraph 8.b. (ORCON) which made possible an interpretation that extraction without originator approval of ORCON controlled information was permissible within Headquarters elements. Since these editorial changes were made without full coordination with the DO, it was some time after issuance that we became aware of the change.

4. By early Spring of 1984 we began making representations to the Executive Secretary of SECOM to make changes in the language of the DCID which would make absolutely clear that the ORCON meant that no extraction without originator permission was possible. In effect we asked for a return to the original text before the editorial changes had been made. In late Summer or

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early Fall we were advised by the Executive Secretary that SECOM had approved changing the language back to the original so that the approved paragraph read "Information bearing this marking may not be disseminated beyond the Headquarters elements of the recipient organizations and may not be incorporated into other reports or briefings, or used in taking investigative action without the advance permission of, and under conditions specified by, the originator. As this is the most restrictive marking herein, agencies will establish procedures to ensure that it is only applied to particularly sensitive intelligence and that timely procedures are established to review requests for further dissemination of intelligence bearing this marking. This marking may be abbreviated as ORCON or as OC."

5. With assurance of SECOM approval of this paragraph, on 1 November 1984 we prepared a cable to all of our customer agencies which contained guidance on DO ORCON clearance procedures and with approval of the SECOM Executive Secretary we also included the new text of the DCID paragraph quoted above noting that it would be issued in the near future by the SECOM.

6. In May 1985, as we were about to reissue the same guidance on the ORCON clearance procedures, we requested you to give us an official statement indicating SECOM approval of the new ORCON control marking so that we could use it as a basis for dealing with analysts in clearing DO disseminated information for use in briefings, finished intelligence and in any other manner contrary to the ORCON control. We did receive from you a memorandum (copy attached) dated 15 July 1985 providing us with the statement of the approved SECOM language for ORCON. You also informed us of the fact that all DCIDs were being reprinted without textual change but with new numbers and that SECOM originated DCIDs would bear their old numbers, e.g., DCID 1/7.

7. As you recall we argued against such reprinting without the textual changes recommended in the definition ORCON, as this would only cause more confusion. This notwithstanding, the DCIDs were reprinted and published. We are now asking for a status report on the revision and reprinting of DCID 1/7 reflecting the changes in the ORCON definition as approved by SECOM and as indicated in your 19 July 1985 memorandum attached. We would also appreciate a status report on our 11 January 1985 recommendation to modify the first and second sentences in footnote 6 on page 6 of the DCID to read as follows:

"Non-Intelligence Community components of the executive branch of government under contract to fulfill an intelligence support role may be treated as members of the

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Intelligence Community. In that event, release will be made only with the consent of the originator, will be solely for the specific purpose and will not include authority to disseminate intelligence further."

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Attachment



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**SUBJECT: Recommended Changes in the
Revision of DCID 1/7**

Distribution:

- 2 - Addressee
- 1 - C/PCS
- 2 - C/PCS/INT/RR
- 1 - C/PCS/PGG

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) Request for Modification of DCID 1/7

FROM:

Policy Branch/PPS
Office of Security

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE 11 February 1986

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. C/Policy Branch

2/12

EB

2. AC/PPG

not seen

3. EXD

2/12

127.6

Mm

4. ~~DD/PS~~ DD/PS

12 FEB 1986

2/12

SL

5. D/S

12 FEB 1986

2/13

J

6.

7. PPS

2/12

2/13

MUV

8. OS Registry

2/13

BL

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15.

Attached is a request from the C/PCS/INT/DO for the D/S to introduce a recommendation for change to footnote #6 of DCID 1/7 (attached as BASIC) to the SECOM membership.

 addressed this request in January 1986 to C/SECOM in reference A memo (attached as BASIC). C/SECOM requested that the CIA member formally introduce the request after Agency consultation.

The request has been reviewed in DDI and OS/SSC who concur with its adoption into the DCID, as stated.